

DD/S&T# 3308-23

OEL-352-73

24 OCT 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for
Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Unclassified Omnibus NSCID

REFERENCE: Memorandum from AD/DCI/IC to A/DD/S&T,
Unclassified Omnibus NSCID, 17 October
1973 (DD/S&T-3234-73)

1. I have reviewed the latest draft of the unclassified NSCID attached to reference as Tab A. Primarily, I addressed that section of the NSCID that has the major impact on DD/S&T and particularly OEL's mission viz. Paragraphs 8a, 8b and 8c. An ordered list of brief comments is attached.

2. Paragraph 8a is apparently included to deal with the National Reconnaissance Program and should be included for completeness. The wording could be improved and your revision as pencilled in on my copy is appropriate. This paragraph (assuming the same membership for EXCOM) would then read:

"a. Intelligence collection resources involved in national technical verification of or related to international agreements such as those on strategic arms limitation and limited nuclear test bans will be managed by an Executive Committee under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the President's Scientific Advisor as other members. The Director of Central Intelligence will issue directives to implement the necessary management organization and operating procedures."

ILLEGIB

NSA review(s) completed.

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common concern. The departments or agencies represented in the USIB should continue to be individually responsible for the photographic interpretation and production of photographic intelligence in support of established departmental or Agency responsibilities.

- (5) Signals intelligence activities in support of specialized objectives of the DCI in discharging his intelligence community responsibilities."

Included in this alternative is the modification of Subparagraph 8b to read almost as you suggest:

"The Secretary of Defense will have primary responsibility for signal intelligence collection and processing as a service of common concern responsive to the priorities and requirements established by the DCI."

Finally, I recommend reordering Paragraph 8 as follows: h, a, g, b and x.

4. The other alternative is to modify 8b and c as follows:

"b. The Secretary of Defense, responsive to the priorities and requirements established by the DCI, will provide for signals collection and processing as a service of common concern."

25X1

25X1

"c. The CIA has responsibility for U. S. clandestine activities abroad and liaison with foreign governments on intelligence and security matters."

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5. I believe either of these alternatives would be more consistent with the basic theme of the draft NSCID. The changes are necessary to give proper recognition to the role of the CIA in technical SIGINT program, particularly as related to ELINT in supporting the DCI in the discharge of his community responsibilities. In addition, the changes are needed to adequately cover the CIA responsibilities in the field of foreign liaison. The significance of foreign intelligence liaison, as established in the current NSCIDs, must be kept in plain view in the omnibus NSCID. The assertion of this responsibility will be of particular importance in maintaining a unified liaison program with foreign governments and in the coordination of SIGINT and other technical collection activities. The implementation of specific CIA responsibilities will undoubtedly occur through appropriate DCIDs or their equivalent. The last sentence of Paragraph 3b(14), as written, leaves a loophole for "departments and agencies" to essentially ignore the directions of DCIDs. To strengthen the authoritative weight of these supplementary directives, the following is a recommended change: "Such regulatory directives shall be promulgated (issued) and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies involved in the collection and production of intelligence".

6. As a general observation on the draft NSCID, I would point out that certain items are subject to misunderstanding since, by inference, they can give the impression of excessive duplication in the intelligence function. These are paragraphs 6b and 7b which I note are also questioned by you. As one further general comment, I think item 7i is totally inappropriate.

7. In summary, I feel that while further editorial changes in the draft would be desirable, these are not of a critical nature with respect to the DD/S&T and OEL missions. We will assist further in the editorial review if desired, but on those matters pertaining to the CIA

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technical collection and analysis roles, I urge that you take whatever actions are required to implement the changes recommended in the presentation of the ideas delineated in Paragraphs 8a, b and c of the current draft.

/s/ JAMES V. HIRSCH

JAMES V. HIRSCH
Director of ELINT
DD/S&T

Attachments

Comments as stated

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D/OEL:JVHirsch (24 Oct 73)

Attachment
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COMMENTS ON DRAFT OMNIBUS NSCID

1. Page 2 - in order to avoid the impression of unduly stacking the deck, Paragraph 3a(3) needs a modifying clause such as "that are needed in the day to day activity of the intelligence community".
2. Paragraph 3b(1) - reads like motherhood.
3. Paragraph 3b(12) - is necessary from an operational viewpoint of getting workable referencing systems, but as with Paragraph 3b(13) it need not appear in this document.
4. Paragraph 3b(14) - as written leaves a loophole for other community components to essentially ignore the directions of the DSCIDs. The language needs strengthening.
5. Paragraph 3c - is probably necessary in some form to assuage the services but as it stands it is awkwardly phrased.
6. Paragraph 5a - this responsibility seems to have been already assigned to the CIA in 1947. The idea of having other intelligence community components take the lead in certain aspects of production may be sound but the wording as it stands is too direct.
7. In regard to your definition of coordination in Paragraph 5b - I would suggest that establishing a precise meaning be left as a prerogative of the individual DCI.
8. I agree Paragraph 6b is useless.
9. Paragraph 7b - should be either omitted or given due consideration to useful and necessary duplicative effort. The latter would be difficult to do in an unclassified and short document.

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10. Paragraph 7c - you make a good point in defining explicitly who judges what data are needed.

11. Paragraph 7d - I believe the key idea in maintaining data bases is to assure efficient working channels for exchange of basic intelligence rather than assuring that the data base is readily available for others to use. After all, much data are available but not necessarily in usable formats.

12. Paragraph 7i - is inappropriate for this document.

13. Paragraphs 8a, b and c - are addressed in detail in the body of the memorandum.